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LABOR LAw-ARBITRATION-PowER oF ARBITRATOR To ENJOIN UNION

FROM CONTINUING SLOWDOWN-An arbitrator, acting under a collective
bargaining agreement which called for a "speedy arbitration" procedure,1
issued an award enjoining the unions from continuing a slowdown in
violation of that clause of the agreement forbidding strikes, lockouts, and
slowdowns. A Supreme Court order granted the employers' motion to
confirm the award and overruled the unions' cross motion to vacate. 2
The unions claimed that the arbitrator, in issuing the injunction, had
exceeded the powers granted him under the agreement and had acted
contrary to section 876a of the Civil Practice Act (the New York AntiInjunction Act).3 The Appellate Division affirmed the order with minor
modifications of form. 4 On appeal, held, affirmed. The award of an injunction was proper since nothing short of this would have accomplished
the intent of the parties that there be expeditious and immediately effective
relief. Nor does section 876a bar an injunction as part of an arbitration
award if the bargaining agreement contemplated its inclusion. Matter of
Ruppert, 3 N.Y. (2d) 576, 148 N.E. (2d) 129 (1958).
Today, with arbitration provisions contained in almost all collective
bargaining agreements, 5 the question how far an arbitrator's power extends has been productive of much speculation.6 Arbitrators have employed

1 Under this clause either party could waive other adjustment procedures embodied
in the contract and submit the dispute directly to arbitration. The arbitrator was required
to schedule a hearing within 24 hours and to issue a decision not later than 48 hours
after the conclusion of the hearing.
2 Matter of Ruppert, 2 Misc. (2d) 744 (1956).
a New York Civil Practice Act (Cahill-Parsons 1955) §876a provides that, except under
certain very restricted conditions, "no court nor any judge or judges thereof shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction involving
or growing out of a labor dispute. . . ."
4 Matter of Ruppert, 2 App. Div. (2d) 670 (1956).
5 Over 90% of the estimated 100,000 collective agreements currently in effect provide
for arbitration as the terminal step in grievance procedure. See Davey, "The Proper
Uses of Arbitration," 9 LAB. L.J. 119 at 121 (1958).
6 See in this connection Shulman, "Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations,"
68 HARv. L. REv. 999 at 1009 (1955).
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a wide range of remedies in their awards, including damages, 7 liquidated
damages, 8 penalties,9 mandatory injunctions, 10 and in at least one other
case a restraining injunction similar to that of the principal case.11 New
York, beginning with its pioneering statute of 1920, has been a leader
in the encouragement of arbitration12 and allows the arbitrator a great
amount of freedom. New York courts will vacate an award only upon
certain limited grounds, principal among these being lack of jurisdiction.13
Nevertheless, in the instant case the court conceded it could find no
previous decision wherein it had confirmed an award containing a restraining injunction. However, it reaffirmed the doctrine that an arbitrator's
jurisdiction is defined by the arbitration contract and that such agreements are to be construed, like other contracts, to give effect to the intent
of the parties.14 From this it was reasoned that inclusion of the "speedy
arbitration" provision indicated an evident intent that there be rapid and
immediately effective relief, concluding that nothing short of an injunction would have accomplished that intent. The court cited no precedent
for this conclusion. Nor did it analyze likely alternative interpretations,
such as the possibilities that the parties meant to authorize only an interpretation of the contract or the immediate issuance of an award indicating whether or not a contract violation existed. Such possible interpretations appear relatively persuasive when the intent of the parties
is viewed against the background of labor's longstanding and vociferous
antipathy toward injunctions.15 In light of this history it would seem

7

International Harvester (Illinois), 9 LAB. ARB. REP. 894 (1947); In re Phillips Chem-

cal Co. (Texas), 17 LAB. ARB. REP. 721 (1951).

s Matter of Mencher, 276 App. Div. 556 (1950).
9 Matter of East India Trading Co., 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E. (2d) 213 (1953).
10 Matter of Devery, 292 N.Y. 596, 55 N.E. (2d) 370 (1944); Matter of United Bar &:
Grill Employees, 299 N.Y. 577, 86 N.E. (2d) 104 (1949).
11 Wholesale Laundry Board of Trade v. Tarrullo, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) 23 (1951).
12 Other states which have adopted a similar attitude include New Jersey, Massachusetts, Oregon, California, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Connecticut, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Ohio, Michigan and Vvashington. These "reform states" followed generally the 1920 New York arbitration law under which agreements to submit
to arbitration future disputes arising out of the contracts containing such agreements were
made legally valid, enforceable and irrevocable except as any other contract is revocable.
The statute also closed the courts to parties to arbitration agreements until they had
complied with their contracts and authorized the courts to help the parties expedite
arbitration in various ways. See generally KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
38-39 (1952).
13 "The award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment,
either as to law or as to facts. If he keeps within his jurisdiction, and is not guilty of
fraud, corruption, or other misconduct affecting his award, it is unassailable." Matter of
Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494 at 496, 62 N.E. 575 (1902); Matter of Pine St. Realty Co. v.
Coutroulos, 233 App. Div. 404 (1931).
14 Dodds v. Hakes, 114 N.Y. 260 at 265, 21 N.E. 398 (1889); Matter of Marchand v.
Mead Morrisson Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
15 See generally FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
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that an express provision for injunction would be required to establish an
intent, insofar as the union is concerned, to authorize injunctive relief.
Having held that the parties intended the awarding of an injunction,
the court was confronted by section 876a of the Civil Practice Act which
was claimed by the union to deprive the arbitrator of jurisdiction despite
any contrary intent of the parties.16 By interpreting this provision as
inapplicable to an injunction which, while judicially enforced, is issued
initially by an arbitrator, the court avoided a clash between the statute
and the public policy of encouraging arbitration contracts. It reasoned that
since the questioned legislation was the result of union resentment against
the use of injunctions in labor disputes and since the union voluntarily
subjects itself to arbitration, the parties should have power to authorize
an award of injunctive relief by the arbitrator. The willingness in this case
to let the parties' agreement control, necessitating as it did a narrow
interpretation of section 876a, seems a definite extension of the New
York policy to encourage arbitration. Although the decision is significant in its enhancement of the effectiveness of the arbitrator, the danger
is that it may cause labor to reassess its present acceptance of arbitration as a
substitute for economic coercion. The real impact of the principal case
will, however, probably be limited for two reasons. First, the decision
reached was apparently dependent upon the contract provision calling
for "speedy" arbitration, a phrase not likely to be found in many agreements. Second, the result of this case can be effectively avoided by the
insertion in a contract of a simple phrase expressly negating any intention
to give the arbitrator power to award injunctive relief.

Lawrence M. Kelly

16 See

note 3 supra.

